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Introductory remarks: 
Although  the notion of the  Pacific  Basin exists  in terms  of a  geographical 
~entity and  is in fact the largest on  this globe,  there is no  parallel 
regional  definition as  far  as  I  know  in economic  terms.  The  P.B. 
indeed is  composed  of or bordered by  at one  and  the same  time  some  of the 
biggest and  richest economic  powers  in the world  and  some  of the smallest 
and  poorest,  so  that if it were  to be  regarded  as  a  family of Pacific powers 
it should be  the most  varied  family  gathering  imaginable.  In  the trilateral 
context Europe  is the only one  not to be  a  Pacific power  and  the very  last 
for this reason that could be  expeeted  to have  an  economic  poficy for  the 
P.B.  as  such.  On  the other hand  Europe  and  its many  Nations have  the 
experience of a  very wide  range of links  and  relationships with different 
parts of the  P.B.  and  have  profoundly affected or been  affected economically 
speaking,  by  many  Pacific countries.  Some  of these contacts are historical as 
for  instance the Dutch  with  Indonesia or the  British with Malaysia,  Singapore 
and  Hong  Kong  or the  French with Vietnam  and  the New  Hebrides not to speak 
of many  other episodes  in the history of Europe  which  have  also decisively 
influenced what  we  are calling the Pacific world  and  not  forgetting  the major 
influence of China  and  Japan on  European  culture and  vice versa.  In  the inter-
dependent world of today in which  shock  waves  reaching  the Eastern border of the 
Soviet Union  or the Western  shores of the United States would  immediately be 
felt in Europe,  as you will  remembE~r that,  going Westwards  or Eastwards,  there --~----------·------------
is only one  big country in between  Europe  and  the Pacifi'c.  It may  be  a  good 
idea to recall  that Wellington is much  further away  from  Anchorage  indeed 
than Tokyo  is from  London. 
Europe,  ~lthough it remains  an  Atlantic,  Baltic and  Mediterranean power,  is very 
much  alive to  anything which  might  happen  in the Pacific so that the creation 
of an  economic  entity called P.B.  eould not fail  to have  a  profound effect 
on  economic  development  in Europe  and  has  indeed already been referred to as 
"a new  challenge to Europe".  Nevertheless it would  be presumptious  for  a 
,European observer to pretend that he  were  able to contribute at this stage to this 
important trialogue anything more  than 
1.  A series of factual  observations  on  European  trade  (and  investment)  with 
different parts of the p.B.  and 
2.  A number  of questions,  without necessarily answers,  for·a possible future 
economic  policy towards  the P.B.  - and  this is what  I  intend to do  in the first 
and  second part of my  introductory remarks  which  you  have  asked  me  to  make. 
I.. 
Trade  and  Investment in the Pacific:  Basin 
To  try to  introduce in twenty minutes  a  discussion on  Europe's  trade relations 
with  the  P.B.  will of course  involve a  high degree of compression  and  indeed 
the risk of over-simplification.  How  can  one  identify in a  reasonable  way  the 
main  points on  which  the discussion might  focus?  From  the European  point of view 
as  regards  trade  (and  to a  certain extent investment)  I  would.propose  to carve 
the P.B.  up  as  follows: -3-
1.  The  three super powers- U.S.  (and  Canada),  S.U.,  China. 
'2.  The  Central  P.B.  i.e. Japan+ Three  (Korea,  Taiwan  and  Hong  Kong). 
•  ' 
3.  ASEAN  (and  Indochina). 
4.  Others 
a)  Pacific Latin America: 
l 
Mexico,  Guatemala,  Costa Rica,  Panama 
Chile,  Colombia,  Equator,  Peru 
b)  Oceania: 
Australia and  New  Zealand 
The  "P"  in ACP  and  Pacific TOM 
Details of this vast canvas  can  be  found  in the Annexed  Tables  so  I  will 
limit myself to the  following  comm,ents: 
1.  As  far  as  the  three super-powers  are  concerned none  is exclusively committed 
to the Pacific but all of them  have vital interests in the  region.  The  question 
is how  to  determine  the relative importance of the part of each of these countries 
which  reflects its share in the Padfic context.  It is recognized that there has 
been  an  important shift of  economic~ activities  from  the eastern part of the U.S. 
to its pacific states.  But  only under quite exceptional  conditions  the U.S.  might 
be  able to bring its full  economic  weight  to bear on  its pacific relations whereas 
in terms  of normal  trade or investment  flows  only China  might  be counted  as 
entirely a  Pacific power  as  all he:r  major outlets are situated at the Pacific coast. 
In my  present excercise it would  not  make  sense,  indeed  to include the whole  of 
the United States or by  all means  the Soviet Union,  Canada  or Mexico  into the 
Pacific.  The  United States alone  :ls  by  far the most  important  economic  partner 
of the  EC  and  is responsible for approximately l/7th of EC's  external  trade,  a 
figure which  in turn considerably outweighs  the total Pacific.commitment of-the EC, 
which  amounts  to only  13%  of our  imports  and  roughly  10%  of our  exports  (excluding 
North America).  To  measure  the relevant part of our trade with the U.S. ~-~~-~-~------------------~---·----------· ----
-4 .. 
to be  included in the Pacific Exercise,  one  should therefore assess  how  much 
'of EC  trade with  the U.S.  starts or arrives  in the  P.B.  There  are interesting 
•  ' 
U.S.  custom statistics which  show  that  a  growing  percentage of U.S.  total exports 
and  imports  are handled by  the Pacific ports.  This  figure  stands at 18.3 and 
19.7%  in 1978  for total U.S.  imports  and  exports but much  less i.e.  only 1/lOth 
I 
of U.S.  trade with western Europe  is,  as  could be expected,  handled by  the·u.s. 
Pacific region.110n1y  this  lOth  of total U.S./EC  trade  (and  I  guess  a  similar 
percentage  could be  estimated for Canada  and  Mexico)  should therefore be  added 
to our trade figures  with other Padfic partners when  calculating  the full weight 
of EC's  economic  relations with  the Pacific basin.Needless  to  say there seem  to be  no 
corresponding  figures  available fo:r  the Pacific ports of the Soviet Union.  The 
day  may  come  yet when  a  full  fledg1ed  development  of Siberia's  tremendous  resources 
could create a  new  economic  situation in the  Pacific Basin which  might  even 
indirectly affect Europe's part in it. 
2.  As  for  China,  traditionally and  again potentially probably. the most  important 
partner for Europe  in the Pacific,  European  exports  and  imports  during  the last 
decade  never reached  10%  of our total trade with the  P.B.  This  is particularly 
due  to  the  fact that China's  export possibilities are relatively· limited,  like those 
of most  Communist  countries,  and  g:i.ven  a  need  for bilaterally balanced  trade,  exports 
into this unsaturated market  are  limited as  well. 
3.  By  comparison,  Japan  and  its fast developing neighbors  (Korea,  Taiwan  and 
Hong  Kong)  which  for economic  reasoning  I  may  be  allowed  to put into the  same 
*  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * 
1/ 
Footnote:.  This  Pacific portion though  increasing considerably in absolute figures 
is slightly decreasing percentage ltise,  fluctuating around  10~ of total U.S.  exports 
and  imports  to and  from  Europe) -5-
basket for this particular exercise constitute indeed our most  important  trading 
'partners in the Pacific region.  This  part of the  Basin which  has  developed  as 
its economic  center stands  indeed for almost  2/3rds of our  imports but only for  40% 
of our exports  into the Pacific.  It is not my  intention to enter here and  now  into 
a  discus,sion of the well-known  problems  created in our bilateral relations by  this 
imbalance. 
I  would  rather draw  your attention to  two  significant data:  one  is the  tremendous 
growth  of exports  of manufactured  l~oods  from  Japan and  its neighbor countries into 
Europe  during  the last decade.  By  comparison with total European  imports  and 
~exports which  went  up  four times  from  1968  to  1978,  imports  from  Japan itself 
increased nine times,  from  Hong  Kong  five,  from  Taiwan  15  and  from  South  Korea  55 
times.  All of these countries have  thus  outflanked continental China  in their 
2/ 
exports  to  the Community. 
The  second point to make  is the predominant  role of Japan in inter-Pacific trade. 
Japan is first as  a  customer  and  supplier to Thailand,  Vietnam;  Indonesia,  Malaysia 
and  to Mainland  China  and  first as  supplier to Singapore,  the Philippines,  North 
and  South  Korea,  Taiwan  and  Hong  Kong  as well  as  top  customer  for Australia.  By 
comparison  the U.S.  are first for  imports  and  exports  in Japan itself and  as market 
for the Philippines,  South  and  North  Korea,  Taiwan,  Hong  Kong  and  Singapore. 
Europe  can  boast of being  the main  partner in both directions only to  New  Zealand 
and  is defending its position as  a  top customer with Chile and  Australia.  From  the 
trading point of view  the P. B.  has  in fact become  above  all  a  Japanes  B~sin, the 
U.S.  a  strong runner-up  and  the  EC  a  creditable third. 
*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * 
2/ 
Footnote:  The  exceptional  growth  of exports  from  Korea  is of course partly explained 
by  the  low  starting level.  On  the other hand  the share of the United States  in 
Korean  exports of manufactured goods  fell  from  1970  to  1978  by  more  than l/3rd.and the 
share of the Community  rose  2  1/2 times,  particularly as  the U.S.  market  in textiles 
.  .  f  1972  h  h  1  1  ... ~nl  "f"~.J  hv  .. hn  rnr.1'l111111 t-v'  )  ~!nee  th~ Am~rican res.tnct1ons o  as  een  arve  v  • .- ~  dl  • -6-
4.  Where  the  EC  has  made  a  particular effort is in the  ASEAN  region which  is 
our second  largest partner in the Pacific and  of great importance for the 
supply of key  conunodities  in the agricultural  and  mineral  field.  When  introducing 
our  economic  policies in the region  I  will elaborate on  this.  Summing  up,  the 
relative importance of the  P.B.  as  a  whole  for the European  Community  has not 
changed considerably during the last decade  (1968-1978),  Imports  from  the  region 
have  grown  by  1.4 points  (from  13.7 to  15.1%  of our total  imports;  exports  came 
down  by  2.2 points  (from  13.7 to  11.5%  of our total exports),  the western coast of 
America  always  included.  Trade has  infact developed at a  slightly slower pace  than 
• the totality of EC's  foreign trade relations.  These  figures  however  cover wide 
variations  in trends  when  one  descends  from  the generality to· the particular areas 
of the  Pacific region.  Particularly there is a  tremendous  growth  in the  share of the 
central part of the P.B.  in our imports  (from  3,3%  to  7,6%)  accompanied  by  a  modest 
increase of the share of the same  ·Countries  in our  exports  (from  3.  4%  to 4%), 7 
II. 
1.  Economic  Policies  for  the  Pacific  Basin 
Following  the  conclusion  at  which  I  arrived  at  the  end  of  the  factual 
analysis  which  I  made  in  the  first  part  of  my  address  there  is  no  need 
for  furthe~ explanation  why  the  European  Community  (or  any  other  third 
country)  has  no  uniform  economic  policy  to  offer  to  the  whole  of  the 
P.B.,  given  the  number  of divergent  and  sometimes  conflictin~ situations 
which  arise  in  this  region  whose  only  common  element  seems  t"~·--b~  its 
geography. 
As  Jong  as  there  is  no  Pacific  Economic  Community  covering  under  a  system 
of  common  rules  the  whole  or  essential  parts  of the  Basin  and  as  long 
as  divergent  politico-economic  systems  continue  to  exist  in  that  part  of 
the  world,  the  European  Community  will  have  to  approach  these  divergent 
situations  by  somewhat  differing  methods.  I  would  like  to  review  these 
different  policies  first  and  then  launch  myself  into  some  random  spec-
ulation  on  what  sort  of  common  rules  might  one  day  be  applied  to  the 
P.B.  "as  such"  in  case  a  sufficient  number  of  interested  countries 
would  agree  to  that. 
Evidently  our  multilateral  non-discriminatory  system  of  GATT  rules  and 
connected  agreements  as  reviewed  and  enlarged  during  the  Tokyo-round 
of  M.T.N.  will  guide  European  economic  policies  in  the  P.B.  as  everywhere 
else  in  the  world.  In  many  cases  we  need  neither  add  nor  deduct  any-
thing  from  this  code  of  international  rules  for  tariffs  and  trade. 
According  to  Part  IV  of  GATT  we  discr~minate  in  favour  of  L.D.C. 's  and 
a  relatively  large  number  of  these  countries  in  the  region  profit  from 
our  system  of  General  Preferences.  Several  of  them  indeed  figure  well 
up  in  the  list of countries  profiting  from  this  scheme  tsee  attached 
table).  Furthermore,  some  of  the  smallest  pacific  countries  are  partners 
to  the  Lome  Agreements  and  the  last  terri~ories which  are  noi  yet 8 
independent  get  special  assistance  under  the  European  regul~tions for 
ove!seas  territories  (see  attached  list). 
2.  For  the  ASEAN  group  of  countries  where  high  growth  r•tes  prevail  and 
Europ~an investment  is  strongly under-represented  in  spite  of the 
availabilify of  many  key  commodities  in  the  region,  Europe  has  recently 
made  a  special  effort of  closer  cooperation  in  order  to  step  up  trade  -
relations  and  capital  flow.  The  fourteen  foreign  ministers  (nine  from 
EC  and  five  from  ASEAN)  met  in  November  last  in  Brussels  and  agr~ed  on 
a  package  of  joint resolutions  which  add  up  to  a  full  programme  of  future 
a c  t~i v it  i e s .  A  cooperation  agreement  is  under  negotiation  between  the 
two  groups.  EC  opened  recently  a  diplomatic  delegation  in  Bangkok 
accredited  to  all  five  governments  of  ASEAN  which  ~ill  look  after 
economic  relations  with  the  whole  of  the  region.  In  February  last  an 
important  EC/ASEAN  conference  for  industrial  cooperation  brought 
hundTeds  of  European  business  men  and  bankers  to  Jakarta.  A  system 
of  investment  protection  arrangements  will  link  all  Member  States  of 
EC  to  their  ASEAN  counterparts.  Finally -an  EC/ASEAN  trade  and 
investment  forum  for  relevant  business  organizations  of  the  two0 
regions,  comparable  to  the  ASEAN/US  and  ASEAN/Japan  business  councils 
is  under  preparation. 
3.  As  for  China  the  most  spectacular  move  has  been  the  accrediting  of  a 
Chinese  Ambassador  to  EC  in  September  1975  ~nd  the  signing  of  a  trade  - ~greement between  the  Peoples  Republic  of  China  and  the  EC  in  Spring  1978. 
Since  then  visits  to  China  have  taken  place  first  by  Vice-President 
Haferkamp  accompanied  by  an  important  European  business  delegation,  and 
then  by  the  President  of the  EC  Commission  and  the  Pre~ident of  the 
European  Parliament.  The  spectacular rise of  European  exports  t6 
China  in  1978  may  just  have  been  a  coincidence  and  did  not  change ·the 9 
order  in  between  the  trilateral  members  in  Chinese  imports  and  exports 
by  comparison  with  former  years,  i.e.  Japan  an  undisputed  first  with 
almost  30%,  the  EC  at  around  half of  this  percentage  and  the  US 
responsible  for  approximately  5%  of  imports  into  China.  As  for  the 
trade  agreement  which  the  EC  concluded,  it is non-pre£erential,  provides 
a  w·ide  ranging  MFN  c 1 a use,  a  mutual  promise  to  1 i beral is  e  and  to  expand 
reciprocal  trade  in  a  balanced  way  and  contains  a  consultation  and 
safeguard  clause  of  the._m~tual~kind whith  Japin~reftised to  the  Community 
in  the  early 70's. 
4.  There  is  probably  good  reason  for  me  to  avoid  invoking  the  shade  of 
• 
thi~  safeguard  clause.  Nevertheless  I  cannot  resist  recalling  to  those 
who  did  not  follow  these  events  that  the  bilateral negotiations  between 
the  EC  and  Japan  which  intended  to  settle our  ove~all  problems  stranded 
on  the  rock  of the  mutual  safeguard  clause  as  we  were  not  able  to  find 
satisfactory criteria to._exclude  arbitrary discriminatory unilateral 
action.  It  is  debatable  of  course  whether  such  safeguard  would  have 
been  conducive  to  a  higher  degree  of  export  restraint  than  that  which 
the  Japanese  government  and  industries  have  been  applying  an~how of 
their  own  free  will.  Rather  the  other  way  round,  one  might  argue  that 
the  question  of  the  selective  safeguards  having  not  yet  been  settled 
either bilaterally or  during  the  Tokyo  Round,  has  left  a  spectre  behind 
which  people  who  like  to  make  the  flesh  creep  with  the  threat  of 
protectionism or  discrimination  will  be  able  to  bring  out  from  time  to 
time.  Others  may  look  at  the  whole  issue  of  discrimination  in  a  slightly 
cynical  way:  when  a  professor  for  international  law  sometime  before 
World  War  One  was  asked  for  a  definition of what. non-intervention  meant 
he  replied  by  saying that  the  definition  was  about  the  same  as  that  for 
intervention;  there  might  be  a  case  for  reconsidering  the  definition  of· 
non-discrimination  in  th~ same  light.  Much  depends  indeed  on  the  way 10 
you  look  at  a  given  situation  and  to  what  extent  you  are  ready  to  take 
into  account  the  economic,  social  and  even  political  problems  of  your 
partner.  Our  Japanese  friends  - it must  be  said  to  their credit  -
have  made  considerable  efforts  to  do  this  in  spite of the  fact  that 
they  were  n~t. bound  by  any  precise bilateral  or multiiateral  commitment, 
since  there  is  no  agreed  interpretation of  what  discrimination  or. 
selectivity means  in  the  application  of art.  XIX  of  GATT. 
Instead,  it seems  to  be  a  very  hopeful  development  that  the  EC  and  Japan 
have  embarked  on  a  broad  policy  of mutual  consultation,  cooperation  and 
.understanding.  Regular  high  level  meetings,  voluntary  export  restraint 
• 
whe~ necessary,  fruitful  case  studies  on  n.t.b.'s  -European  and 
Japanese  schemes  for  scholarships  and  exchange  of  people  - - promotion 
of  joint ventures  - have  been  some  of the  major  steps  marking  this  way. -11-
2.  Looking  further  ahead  the question arises what  a  Pacific Basin or a 
Pacific Region  of Peace might  mean  one  day  in economic  terms.  Could  we  expect 
this  region to  follow the European  example  and  establish one  or several Customs  Union 
or Free Trade Areas?  Taking  advantage of our  own  long  standing  tradition and 
experience  in this  field  I  submit  that nothing similar will happen  in the  Pacific 
or even if it did that it would  not have  any  far reaching effects.  Even  in the 
ASEAN  region of five southeast asian countries,  most  of them  pacific,  a  region 
to which  the  EC  has  accorded  some  technical  assistance in the establishment of 
custom  tariff nomenclature  and  tariff reduction progress  in reducing  internal 
~ tariffs has  been  extremely  limited.  It is difficult to  imagine that free countries 
could  lower or abandon  their tariffs for  japanese or chinese  imports.  Maybe  that, 
'  the other way  round  Japan unilaterally might  enlarge its 95P  of even  abolish 
tariffs on  imports  from  the pacific: region following  the example  set by  the  EC 
"  for all members  of the  Lome  Agreement.  But  after all tariffs have  been brought 
down  considerably under theleadership of GATT  and  will  only in marginal  cases have 
a  decisive influence on  international  economic  relations;  even  those who  might 
disagree with  this view  will  certainly accept  that  the  impact  of customs  tariffs 
on  international trade cannot by  any  means  be  compared  with  the  disastrous  consequencE 
of monetary  fluctuations  or inflation.  The  same  could be said about Q.R. 's or 
other N.T.B. 's which  may  continue to constitute in certain fields,  like agriculture, 
important obstacles for international trade,  and  should be attacked in the 
framework  of MTN  codes  ot bilaterally in a  pennanent effort to  achieve  a  higher 
degree  of'marked  transparency and  access  to  the  consumer.  ·These  too  like other 
questions arising from  the well  known  canvas  of classical  trade policies will 
continue to draw  affection,  but have no  common  denominator with  the decisive 
--~ 
problems  of which  depends  a  common  future of our interdependent· world. I  refer here  to problems  of sheer  survival  for mankind  like the North-South 
imbalance  aggravated  through  the additional danger of unsecured oil supply. 
To  solve  these questions will more  and  more  become  a  precondition for economic 
stability and  development  throughout  the world.  Even  so  vast an  area as  the 
Pacific  ~ould not be  able to  find  an  independent solution,  without being  in 
agreement  with  the Atlantic world  and  the countries of the  Indian Ocean.  But 
('l,ny  move  to closer economic  cooperation inside the Pacific Basin will have its 
beneficial side-effects on  the rest of the world,  provided it keeps  the basic 
values of fair competition and  free  access  to markets  and  commodities  alive and 
~strengthens international cooperation and  exchange  of cultural values,  including 
technology worldwide.  These  are  the  essential tasks  for our  common  future.  As 
for the European  Community,  we  are only too  eager to contribute to such  a  laudable 
effort. 
Europe  has  played its part for  mor~l than  2,000 years  in the history of mankind. 
We  have  seen  the Atlantic Community  to which  or undoubtedly belong to the ones 
the heavy  burden of worldwide  responsibilities.  In recent yea:rs  developments 
have  taken place in the Pacific which  indicate that the  accent in world affairs 
may  shift again.  We  see this  happe~n without  envy but with great interest as  we 
hope  that a  vast sphere of economic  prosperity and  peace in the  Pacific will 
almost  automatically include Europe  and  the Atlantic in an  interdependent world of 
tomorrow. 
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0,9 
~ 235,4 
H1PORTATIONS 
774  I  1,7 
1780  2,1 
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~;.11.1978 
n~/gj 
va~e~rs  :  1.c:a  uc  ., 
-- -
l~portations totales  tous  produits  I  lrportaticns  sous  SPG 
' 
Origines  25  a 49  et  I  01  .T  24  25  a  99  o1  a 99 
i 
o1  a 24  so  a 63  64  a 99  I  o1  a 99 
il  s (  2)  a.s.  <2>  u.s.  5  H  I  a.s.  r~. s. 
Extra  CEE  29.357.143  10.849.929  32.965.525  173.172.597  1  2 
Classe  2  15.743.606  4.808.979  54.591.427  7).144.012  1 
I 
A.C.P.  5.268.480  316.771  6.899.502  12.484.753 
Benefi- 15.572.306  5.031.944  55.267.839  75.871.963  360.371  57.295  645.543  384. soJ  122.  98< 1.256.572  1.019.776 3.84?.049  ciaires  (1) 
dont  :  .  - . 
Yougoslavie  238.202  336.298  965.756  1.540.256  - - 11.965.  35.89  18.461  184.041  185.414  435.774 
i-lalaysia  3:.3.619  67.124  919.268  1.330.011  68.407  - 223.075- 21.45~  27C:  27.442  19.595  360.249 
Hong  Kong  21.057  1.013.816  957.396  1.  992.269  - - 1. 686.  26.54'  46.444  93.124  173.414.  341.217 
In  de  552.213  437.610  650.913  1.  640.736  15.175  946  20.870.  68.20~  3.74<;  93.59A  122.736  325.277 
Coree du Sud  89.475  507.499  660.860  1.257.834  7.644  - 2.971 ..  76.87~  36.147  86.47~  95.181.  305.281 
Bresil  2.247.154  211.271  996.301  3.454.726  i  71.843  767  44.536.(  28:001  4.946  47.954  106.937  ..  304.984 
I 
Roumanie  147.707  172.2?3  683.140  371  - 4 .450·  213  1RI'I  ><~1  !.?  t\1  . .._  I  247.931  1.003.120  '14:8;41 
'"''- • v-v. 
Philippines  324.688  66.833  171.903  563.424  32.752  - 57.913.  17.377  1.  00~  10.331.  134.181 
V~:1ezuela  27.184  435  482.592  510.211  - - 1.143.  209  - 120.348.  6. 178.  127.878 
Singapour  34.772  112.218  481.561  628.551  610  - 5.704.  24.168  4.1H  32.003  57.314  123.917 
lndonesie  449.855  3.293  403.491  856.639  452  53.097  61.668.  57~  2f  219  4.590.  120.628 
Thailande  487.564  90.152  173.300  751.016  26.919  - 22.662.  19.047  74c  32.741  16 •.  768.  118.882 
Argentine  1.428.023  134.241  226.748  1.789.012  5.688  - 29.986.  13.64E  3oc  16.067  47.699.  113.393 
Pakistan  57.401  134.555  81.684  273.640  2.312  - 15.312·  22.169  131  68.733  3. 821·  112.484 
l'lex ique  163.863  62.298  202.466  428.627  7.010  127  15.463.  5.043  2.34~  15.978  43.  656~  89.623 
Colombie  601.041  55.157  56.637  712.835  4.209  2.326  1.245.  7.92~  3l  2.234  2.697  20.666 
Perou  60.657  41.409  202.013  304.079  39  - 13.246.  1.617  2~  1.017  1.865  17.813 
17  Pays  7.274.475  3.446.482  8.316.029  19.036.986 ll  243.4311  57.263  533.895  ~  3tS.75i  118.97S  1.01?.623'  960.24213~300.184 
·-
t·  17  Pays/  ,,  . 
82, n  ~  95,  9:t.  benefi  t.6, 7  X  68,  SY.  15,  Oi.  25,1i.  99,9i.  96,  71.  81,  o~:  94,2"'.  85,8X  cLJires 
.~  6 7  ,6"1. 
It  f 
-
6-
(1)  Pour  ce  ta~Leau,  t~n~ficiaires = claise 2.- TOM  ~  C:M  - Taiwan  +  Yougoslavie  +  ~cu~Jnie; 
(2)  Calculs  effectues  sur  la  base  d~ vateurs  ~oyennes. 
~Q~!£! :  S.C.E. 
I. r  • 
EXPORTATIONS  ET  IMPORTATIONS  DE  LA  CEE  VIS-A-VIS  DES  ACP  ET  DES  TO~  CU  PACIFIQUE 
• 
Cod~ 
geonom. 
C8o1> 
(815) 
(817> 
A.C.P. 
Papouasie/Nouvelle  Guin~e 
fidj i 
Tonga 
<819)  Samoa  occidentale 
T.O.M. 
(703)  Brunei 
(809)  Nouvelle  Caledonie et  d~p. 
(811)  Iles Wallis et  Futuna 
(816)  Nouvelles  Hebrides 
(822>  Polinesie  fran~aise 
._ .....  -__..~--------
1976 
-
46,2 
17,9  . 
26,1 
1,1 
I 
1,1  .. 
216,3 
32,7 
103,5 
0,2 
5,6 
74,3 
... 
P'IILLIONS  D
1 UCE 
EXPORTATIONS  .. 
1977  1978  '  1976 
' 
53,0  62,3  211,9 
25,9  27,9  165,2 
24,7  29,9  41,2 
0,8  1,1  3,2 
1,6  3,4  .  2,3 
242,2  248,4  193,1 
'40,4  '  34,1  0,7  ' 
107,9  100,7  179,0 
0,2  1,0  o, 1 
6,5  7,7  7,7 
87,2  104,9  5,6 
. 
f 
. - -
.........  ._...  ~-
IMPORTATIONS 
1977 
309,0 
225,1 
74,7 
4,0 
5,2 
189,1 
1,7 
167,4 
0,0 
14,4 
5,6 
~ 
-'1.  -!' 
/_r~  Cf  I 
1978 
341,2 
217,2 
117,3 
2,7 
4,0 
110,8 
'1,  1 
92,9 
o,o 
11,1 
5,7 
' 
1 
>l  ,,. ! 
~ j 
tJ 
·~ 
:t 
' 